Abstract. Network-layer authentication security services are typically pessimistic and static. A conservative IP security gateway checks/veri es the authentication information for every packet it forwards. This implies that, even there is no bad guy in the network, the authentication check is still performed for every packet. In this paper, we examine a sleepy approach, where the gateways normally do not authenticate or verify the packets unless security attacks are detected. We propose a security protocol, SSGP (Sleepy Security Gateway Protocol), residing on top of the IPSEC (Internet Security Protocol). One important feature of SSGP is the collaboration model between network and application layer security mechanisms.
Introduction
In the Internet, the demilitarized zones (DMZ) separated by rewalls or security gateways CB94] are static. The system administrators decide the con guration options about the rewalls, which remain unchanged for months or years. For instance, packet ltering rewalls consistently check every incoming packets and reject unauthenticated packets. The checking is done even when there is NO security attack to the networking system.
Traditionally, these gateways are provided only in the transport or application layer. Implementing this type of ltering mechanisms in the network/IP layer is bene cial but causes the potential performance problem as mentioned in section 3 of RFC1636 BCCH94] as well as section 5.3 of RFC1825 Atk95] . For example, in swIPe IB93] , if the security check is done in purely software, then it is measured that we need to pay 100 microseconds per IP packet plus 1 microsecond per byte for MD5 and 10 microseconds per byte for DES. One obvious way to improve the performance is to use some hardware solutions (e.g. Ebe92] ). However, as pointed out in Lin94], since the network layer itself generally is implemented in software, it is hard to make e ective use of cryptographic hardware.
Generating and verifying the MAC (message authentication code) for every IP packet consume the network resources. The performance of the most commonly used MAC scheme, MD5, can be found in Tou95]. On the other hand, more and more Internet applications have their own authentication process. For example, Kerberos NT94], SNMPv2 GM93], MobileIP's Registration Protocol Per96] , and the next release of Java Mic, DFW96, WDH + 96] have or will have built-in application layer authentication mechanisms. This means that the same IP payload will pass through the MAC process twice, one in the network layer and another in the application layer. The problem is that whether we could do something smart to reduce the security overheads.
In this paper, SSGP (Sleepy Security Gateway Protocol) is presented to eciently o er network-layer authentication services for IPSEC. The key element of SSGP is the Sleepy Security Gateway (SSG) which might be in either one of the following two di erent modes: sleepy and wakeup. In the following sections, through two di erent examples, we will show how SSGP works.
A Simple Example of SSGP

Problem
In Figure 1 , a system administrator establishes a connection with the management agent across a segment of public Internet. According to the IPSEC architecture, we have two security gateways, SSG A and SSG B , and establish a secure channel over the insecure public internet. This scheme is su cient for outside intruders but not good enough for insider. Therefore, we need an application-layer security mechanism or an intrusion detection module to protect the application against the insider's attacks. Please note that if we only have inside intruders, then the security checks being performed by SSG A and SSG B are wasted.
Answer
Assume that we do have an application-layer mechanism (e.g., SNMPv2) to authenticate the application PDU (e.g., SNMP PDU). Then, even no IP layer security mechanism exists, the application is safe in the sense that it will not accept any unauthenticated packets. This is true for attacks from either the insider or the outsider. However, the application might su er from heavier incoming tra c load because all the attack packets can now be delivered to the host directly. And, the application needs to spend time to lter out those bad PDUs. For example, without network-layer protection, in Zor94, Wu95] , it is identi ed that the performance of the SNMPv2 agent drops signi cantly under denial-of-service attacks.
The application-layer security module detects bad PDUs. For example, SNMPv2 security module dropped packets with wrong key-MD5 authentication and replayed packets. This detection information should be forwarded to the security management module. This management module wakes up sleepy security gateways (SSGs) protecting this application. Based on the security association relations de ned in Atk95], these waked-up SSGs might wake up more SSGs. As shown in Figure 2 , SSG A has been waked up by the security management module who received a report from an application. Because a security association exists between SSG A and SSG B , SSG A wakes up SSG B .
At this point, all the packets from the agent to the administrator are authenticated in the public Internet. When this encapsulated IP packet is received by SSG A , it will be decapsulated by SSG A and delivered to MApp with the following format:
IP decap (Agent; MApp) = IP(Agent; MApp) Auth SSGA SSGB : We append the authentication certi cate, Auth SSGA SSGB , at the end of the packet. This information is useful for deciding the attack sources as we will explain later. The reason for appending this certi cate at the end of a regular IP packet is to ensure the compatibility between SSGP packets and normal IP packets.
If we only have outside intruders, then, in theory, no more bad packets will get to the protected host MApp. If MApp still receives bad packets and SSG A did NOT nd any unauthenticated packets, then we conclude we only have \inside intruders." Otherwise, we are under attacks of both insiders and outsiders simultaneously.
We learn three things from the above results: 1. If no attack exists, then we do not pay the network layer authentication overhead. We always need to pay the application security overhead though. 2. Correlating intrusion information from two di erent layers, i.e., network and application layers, we will be able to tell the location of the attack sources. This location information is valuable for security management. 3. If we know that the attack sources are purely from insiders, then we know that the network layer authentication does not help at all. In this case, we should put the waked-up SSGs back to sleep again.
3 Another Example of SSGP
Problem
In Figure 3 , we have four SSGs and we assume that the public network is partitioned into four di erent zones by these SSGs. If from now on the application does not observe any attack, while SSG A detects some unauthenticated IP packets, then we know that the attack source must be either Zone 1 or 4. It depends on the network topology and con guration, and sometimes it may not be possible to further distinguish Zone 1 and 4. In this case, SSG B will sleep all the time.
Similarly, if the application is still under attack and SSG A does not detect bad packets, then the attack source must be in either Zone 2, Zone 3 or from an insider. At this point, the attacking packet should be presented to the security management module, and the module can tell whether it is from SSG C or SSG D by looking at the appended authentication certi cate. If this attack packet is indeed from SSG C , then SSG C will wake up SSG B . Now, an IP packet will pass through two separate IPSEC channels: SSG B , SSG C and then SSG C , Please note that this packet will then have two authentication certi cates appended. At this point, it depends on whether we will observe another attack to decide the attack source location.
Attack Detection in the Application Layer
SSGP is a lazy security protocol. When no application or intrusion detection system complains about attacks, the SSGs will not perform any authentication check. Thus, when no attack presents, the network is equivalent to an unsecure IP network. At this stage, even untrusted hosts can enjoy the network services.
We use SNMPv2 as an example to describe our idea about application-layer attack detection. In Figure 4 , the security gateway in the SNMPv2 agent is in the application layer. An SNMPv2 PDU might be rejected for two reasons: authentication failure or freshness constraint. 
Authentication Failure
If an PDU has an incorrect MD5 signature, this PDU may be an attack, an error in MD5 key con guration, or even a software bug. In any case, we should treat it as an attack and notify the security management module. If this is an error or bug, the SSGP protocol will treat it as an insider attack and, therefore, all SSGs should go back to sleep. Then, some network management modules or system administrators should be noti ed about this problem. In a wireless network, since the bit error rate is higher, sometimes the link layer checksum mechanism might not correct/detect all the errors in the message. This could also cause incorrect MD5 signatures. Therefore, when accessing SNMP agents across wireless links (e.g., CDPD CDP95]), we can not conclude immediately the existence of attacks by justing detecting one single bad PDU. It depends on the link error rate to decide how many bad PDUs are enough to notify the management module.
Freshness Constraint
In SNMPv2, a received PDU might violate the freshness constraint. It could be a replay attack, a duplicated IP packet, or a large network delay. One heuristic is to set a second deadline for the PDU. If the PDU violates the rst deadline, it is silently dropped. If it also violates the second deadline, we consider it an attack.
Attack Detection by Intrusion Detection Systems
Many existing applications do not have any built-in security mechanisms. Therefore, we need to build an intrusion detection system (IDS) Den87, SRS91] to protect them. For example, in NCSU, we are using SNMPv1 (which has no security by itself) on top of Kerberos. Currently, we are building an IDS for SNMPv1 by monitoring the SNMPv1 tra c in our network.
Summary
No golden rules exist for the application layer attack detection. We must de ne the detection policies case by case. For example, to build a detection module for SNMP WMBL94, WMB93] or Kerberos NT94, BM90], we need to understand the application layer protocols themselves very well. Furthermore, we need to know what environment we run this application, e.g., ATM or wireless.
Security Management Modules (SMM)
Security Management Module (SMM) is a key component in a SSGP system. SMM needs to communicate with both network and application layer security mechanisms. In our current prototype implementation, the SMM will interact with SNMP agents, while the agents collects intrusion information from network and application layers. In this section, the architecture of SMM is presented.
Intrusion Detection MIB
An Intrusion Detection MIB (IDMIB) is an abstraction of detected intrusion with standard management information interfaces (e.g., SNMP or CMIP). An IDMIB speci cation document should describe what types of information are available in the MIB. For instance, an intrusion event table (IET) in the IDMIB collects all the locally detected intrusion events. This table (IET) o ers valuable management information for local or even remote SMMs. All information requests from SMMs must be handled by management protocol agents (e.g., SNMP agent).
Attack Detection
In SSGP, network applications themselves and/or intrusion detection systems are capable of detecting intrusion events. Detected events will be stored in the IET. An IET entry (i.e., a row in the IET) consists of attributes (i.e., columns in the IET) related to a detected intrusion event. These attributes may include the attack PDU with its original IP header, the attack type, and a timestamp.
When the networking system is under serious attacks, IET is updated frequently. And, the information kept in the IET is called rapidly changing data Wu95] . In this case, it is important to maintain the information ows between the IDMIB agents and the SMMs. Sometimes, it is more e cient to have agents notify SMMs about newly detected intrusion events. However, there are also cases where it is better to let the SMMs periodly poll the information out of the IDMIB. In practice, a security management system will perform both polling and event noti cation.
Attack Isolation
A local SMM with a local IDMIB sometimes can not handle certain global attacks. For instance, in Figure 2 , the SMM behind SSG A observes attacks, but by itself it can not handle the problem properly. Therefore, SMMs must communicate with each other, exchange intrusion management information, and then a set of collaborating SMMs can decide the correct sources of attacks.
Security Consideration
We consider the following security concerns for SSGP: Security-Sensitive Applications: There are certain important applications that could have very weak security by itself and also it is very hard to build an IDS to protect them. These applications should never be protected by a sleepy security gateway. In other words, the network administrator should con gure the SSG such that it will never go to sleep. It is also important to identify what applications are suitable for the SSGP protection and what are not.
Evil Application Detection: If a protected application is evil, then it could complain about attacks while the attacks do not exist. These will wake up SSG gateways unnecessarily. The problem of detecting such evil/faulty applications is another IDS/security management problem. However, in the worst case, the SSGP will just converge to the static IPSEC architecture.
Compromised SSG Gateways: Compromised SSG gateways can wake up other SSG gateways viciously. In fact, without SSGP, if a security gateway in plain IPSEC is compromised, then many serious attacks can happen. To detect this type of problems is extremely important and generally an open problem.
SNMP Security: We use SNMPv2 in our experiments because of its availability today. We expect that a securer version of SNMP will be standardized in the near future.
Related Works
Network layer security for IP has been studied in Bel96, Orm96, CGHK95, WB96, IB93]. Most of these works focus on design and implementation of a network security system similar to IPSEC Atk95]. The SSGP work presented here went one step further by examining how IPSEC can be used to provide secure and high performance network services.
Security management and intrusion detection system have also been studied extensively (e.g., Den87 , SRS91]). Both logical and statistical approaches have been proposed to handle di erent types of intrusion. SSGP o ers an attractive architecture to integrate IPSEC and the results produced by the IDS community.
Conclusion
The IPSEC architecture Atk95] speci ed only the security building blocks that we could use for Internet security. It has pointed out certain performance overheads for employing the standardized protocols. However, where and how to put these security building blocks in today's internet is a big open problem. It is very clear that careless placement of these blocks will not secure the network but reduce the available bandwidth. Therefore, in this paper, we propose SSGP as a solution to support secure and high performance authentication services on top of IPSEC. We feel that SSGP is an interesting option for the network administration to protect applications with application-layer security mechanisms.
SSGP de nes an architecture about how application and network layer security mechanisms could collaborate under the framework of IPSEC. The collaboration between the security management modules and the SSGP/IPSEC o ers the following advantages: e ciency: SSGP saves unnecessary security checks. The SSG gateways will sleep when either there is no attack or they can not help because it is an insider attack.
isolation: SSGP isolates an outsider attack in its zone by waking up all the SSG gateways around that particular zone.
identi cation: SSGP identi es the possibility of insider attacks by comparing the security information from both network and application layers.
Currently, we are implementing a prototype version of SSGP/IPSEC and hopefully through this experimental system building process, we will learn more about the strength and weakness of SSGP. Our prototyping experiment is being built on top of Linux PCs with EtherNet and AT&T WaveLan cards. We need to modify the networking module code for participating routers/gateways. We also need to modify the applications so that it will observe/report attacks. Finally, we are using CMU's SNMPv2 package to implement the security management module.
In both SSGP and IPSEC, the insider attack will not be detected until it hits the target host's detection module (e.g., MApp). It will be much nicer, while tracking the insider attacks, if we could perform the application layer detection much earlier. One idea that we are working on is to implement the application detection module as a Java applet. Then, in theory, we could send this applet to the SSG gateway and run it over there. For example, if the attack is from SSG B in our previous examples, then we could ask SSG B to load this applet and eliminate the attacks right at that point. The current release of Java does not allow this to happen because of the security concerns of Java itself. We are currently implementing LAVA WDH + 96], a securer version of Java, for this purpose.
